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THE REGULATION ON TRADE BARRIERS UNDER SADC AND EAC: 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Abstract 
There are more regional integration initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa than 
anywhere else in Sub-Sahara Africa. These include Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), East Africa Community (EAC), Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) and Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Owing to the scope of this study, only 
the trade liberalization initiatives under SADC and EAC will be evaluated. The trade 
liberalization strategies will focus on the intra-regional level. 
               This study entails a comparative study of key legal provisions facilitating 
elimination of trade barriers within SADC and EAC trade blocs respectively.  The study 
identifies the underlying objectives that inspired the countries to enter the said regional 
trade agreements. It will focus on the mechanisms adopted to liberalize free movement of 
goods in the SADC Free Trade Area and the EAC Customs Union respectively. Since 
both RTAs carry a firm commitment to take affirmative measures to reduce barriers to 
intra-regional trade, the respective trade agreements should contain a legal framework 
that will drive the trade liberalization objectives. The study seeks to determine whether 
the legal frameworks in the SADC and EAC trade regimes is a viable tool to eliminate 
trade barriers and in turn foster a deeper level of integration. The aim of the study is to 
ascertain whether their constitutive legal framework is effective enough to achieve this 
goal. 
              The study concludes that while the SADC FTA and the EAC custom union have 
already been launched, the levels of intra-regional trade remains low. This is caused by 
failure of some member states to meet their commitments to eliminate tariff barriers, the 
surge of non-tarifff barriers and multiple memberships of SADC and EAC members with 
other regional trade blocs. This study is founded on the belief that lack of enforcement of 
community law at national and community level is slowing down the implementation of 
treaty commitments. This paper recommends that the solution to these problems include; 
getting members whose commitments are outstanding to take steps to align their customs 
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laws to the agreed bench mark, compelling members to refrain from imposing non-tariff 
barriers, increasing customs cooperation and conducting trade on a rule based manner. 
For these goals to be achieved there is need to strengthen institutional structures to 
monitor the implementation as required and harmonise various integration policies in 
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1.1 Overview of Economic Integration in Africa 
Economic integration is a major agenda item for African nations. Increasing intra-
regional trade is central to the drive for integration. Attempts to achieve economic 
integration began in the continent over two decades ago when African leaders signed the 
Abuja Treaty in 1991. The treaty established the African Economic Community (AEC) 
whose key objective is to promote economic, social and cultural development in a view 
increase economic self-reliance and promote a self-sustained development in African 
counties.1 The drafters anticipated that AEC’s objectives would be achieved through a 
gradual process involving six stages each to be completed within a given time frame.2 
The first stage involved the strengthening of existing RECs and creating others where 
they do not exist. This was to be achieved by 1999. The next stage involves the 
elimination of tariff and non tariff barriers. The targeted deadline for this was 2007. The 
third stage envisages the establishment of a free trade area and customs union at the level 
of each REC, to be completed by 2017. The fourth stage involves the coordination and 
harmonization of tariff systems among the RECs in a view of establishing a continental 
customs union with a common external tariff by 2019. The fifth stage envisages the 
establishment of an African common market which will secure the free movement of 
persons, the right of residence and establishment to be completed by 2023.3 The final 
stage envisages the establishment of a Pan-African Economic and Monetary Union with a 
single African currency.4 The motivation for establishing RECs under the Abuja Treaty 
was to use them as building blocks for the eventual continental Economic Community. 
The OAU was replaced by the Africa Union (AU) in 2001. The AU builds on and 
accelerates the objectives of the OAU and the Abuja Treaty. 5 
                                                          
1Article 3(1)(a) of the African Economic Community Treaty. 
2
 Article 3(2) of the African Economic Community Treaty. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Article 6 of the African Economic Community Treaty. 
5 Article 3, Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
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              In terms of the stages of the Abuja Treaty, stage 1 (to be achieved by 1999) has 
been achieved. Significant progress has been made since the Lagos Plan of Action in 
forming regional economic communities to foster trade and economic integration. A 
recent report revealed that there are currently 17 regional trade blocs in the continent.6 
The implementation of the next two stages is ongoing. Some regional economic 
communities (COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS and SADC) have set up free trade areas while 
others have not reached this stage yet.7 Progress towards stages 4 and 5 regarding the 
formation of a continental customs union and common market respectively (to be 
achieved by 2019 and 2023 respectively) has yet to start. The regional trade agreements 
have gone far in reducing tariff levels among members of the RECs. Important progress 
has been achieved in SADC and EAC with realization of a free trade area and the 
formation of a customs union respectively. 8 While states in the EAC’s customs union 
have achieved complete internal tariff elimination and proceeded to launch a common 
market, SADC member states are yet to achieve complete internal tariff elimination and 
move on to establish a customs union. According to the Abuja Treaty framework, SADC 
has until 2017, another four years, to accelerate the attainment of fully fledged customs 
unions. While significant progress has been reached towards tariff elimination in both 
EAC Customs Union and SADC FTA, implementation of commitments to eliminate non 
tariff barriers in both RECs is ongoing. 
              This study will focus on only two RECs, the East Africa Community and the 
Southern African Development Community. The communities do not vary too 
significantly in their structures as both share the common objective of creating a larger 
economic space for trade among their members through the gradual elimination of tariff 
and non tariff barriers to trade.9 Second, both are active in the field of economic 
integration. They envisage the progress through the various stages of economic 
integration and are indeed progressing on the stages though at different paces. This study 
will focus on the liberalisation of trade in goods following the provisions of Article 
XXIV GATT which deals with the establishment of customs union and free trade areas.  
                                                          
6 ‘Economic Development in Africa Report’ UNCTAD 2013 at 46 
7 Ibid at 57 
8 Ibid at 99 
9 Article 75 EAC Treaty and Article 3 SADC Protocol on Trade. 
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1.1.1 An overview of the market integration model 
The three prominent regional blocs in Eastern and Southern Africa (SADC, EAC and 
COMESA) have a common goal to pursue a market led regional integration.10 This 
approach has its foundation in the neoclassical international trade theory which promotes 
free trade, exploits economies of scale and creates a more competitive business 
environment.11This integration model envisages a linear process of trade barrier 
elimination from a free trade area to the deepest level, a political union.12 It calls for the 
establishment of free trade areas where tariffs are removed among member states but 
each country retains its own tariff against non-member states. This would be followed by 
a customs union where the free trade area remains in place and members impose a 
common external tariff. The next stage involves the formation of a common market with 
the free flow of factors of production. Finally an economic union would be formed with 
the unification of monetary and fiscal policies. If political sovereignty is given up, an 
economic union becomes a federation or political union with common legislation and 
political structures. The removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers across borders is 
sometimes referred to as shallow integration while deep integration involves the creation 
of common policies. Deep integration involves more complex policy harmonisation and 
coordination among member states, such integration requires a higher degree of 
adherence to the rule of law. 
              The market led integration has its potential gains such as: increased production 
arising from specialization according to comparative advantage, increased output arising 
from the better exploitation of economies of scale and improvements in terms of trade of 
the bloc in comparison to the rest of the world (Baldwin 1997). African countries have 
pursued regionalism especially market integration to solve the problems created by small 
African economies.13 However economists criticized this model and questioned whether 
an increase in the volume of trade was the main determinant of whether a trade bloc 
increased welfare. According to Viner, the important issue was whether a trade bloc 
                                                          
10
 ‘Economic Development in Africa Report’ UNCTAD 2013 at 98 
11 Richard Gibb, Regional Integration and Africa’s Development Trajectory: meta theories, expectations 
and reality, (2009)Third World Quarterly, Vol: 30 No. 4, at 708. 
12Ibid. 
13 ‘Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities’ a joint 
publication by the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union (2006) at 35. 
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created or diverted trade. According to McCarthy, the most favorable conditions for trade 
creation are not characteristics of developing countries and that as a result regional 
integration among developing countries is likely to have immaterial effects on their 
patterns on trade. Aly argued that the laissez-faire integration did not work in the African 
context because trade is conducted on a very limited scale between African countries.14 In 
such circumstances, continuing with the model was useless and proved to be 
insufficiently workable. The difficulty with these arguments is that they condemn market 
integration model on the basis of the current low levels of trade, which is precisely what 
the adoption of the model is aimed at transforming. 
1.1.2 An overview of the developmental integration model. 
While the linear market integration approach focuses more on the removal of tariff and 
non tariff barriers to trade, the development led integration goes further to include 
cooperation in the planning and implementation of productive activities. The 
development integration agenda hence includes structural transformation, regional 
infrastructure and private sector development. Development integration model was 
developed as a response to the perceived shortcomings of the market integration model 
which focuses almost exclusively on border measures.15  
Market led integration focusing on the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers have 
been the hallmark of African integration efforts. Cooperation in trade liberalization and 
development is one of the pillars of the EAC.16 The EAC trade regime is governed by 
chapter 11 of the treaty. The trade liberalization initiative under the EAC is to be 
achieved through a series of steps, starting with establishment of a customs union, 
followed by a common market and eventually a monetary union. 17The East African 
Customs Union Protocol became operational in 1st January 2005 and achieved complete 
internal tariff elimination by 2010 following the end of the 5 year transitional period. 
This is a major milestone in the integration agenda which was followed by the launching 
of the common market on 1st July 2010. 
                                                          
14 Ibid at 43. 
15T. Hartzenberg, ‘Regional integration in Africa’ Staff working paper No. ERSD 2011-14. World Trade 
Organization (2011) 
16 Article 74 EAC Treaty. 
17 Article 5(2) EAC Treaty. 
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              The SADC trade regime is set up and governed by the SADC protocol on trade 
whose objective is to liberalize goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually 
beneficial and equitable trade agreements.18In keeping up with WTO’s provisions which 
requires FTA to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade, SADC members agreed that 
there should be a total elimination of tariffs of at least 85 per cent of all trade among 
members by 2008.19 The SADC integration efforts have led to significant progress 
towards internal tariff elimination and plan to have the area progress to a customs union. 
The relatively faster pace at which EAC is progressing can be attributed to a number of 
factors. These include its comprehensive and elaborate constitutive instruments and the 
superiority of community law over national law which creates certainty to which system 
of law is applicable in a given situation. 
1.1.3 Economic effects of regional economic integration 
During the last decade, several authors have explored the subject of regional economic 
integration and the most cited theoretical argument in favour of regional integration is 
that it allows for exploitation of comparative advantage within the region. This allows 
nations to specialize in the production of products best suited to their resource and labour 
endowments, without the interference of tariff or other impediments to trade, which in 
turn leads to rapid economic growth as a result of increased intra-bloc trade.20For 
developing countries, regional integration is said to offer a possible route for overcoming 
the disadvantages associated with small markets as it offers the benefit of allowing 
countries to pool their economic resources.21Many developing countries have realized 
that to operate in isolation denies them the market size benefits, opportunities and 
influence in this rapidly globalizing and competitive environment. There are atleast four 
economic gains to be obtained from a larger market size: increased competition, 
exploitation of economies, variety of product and reductions in internal inefficiencies.22 
              Some studies have concluded that economic integration has led to trade 
imbalances, increased financial market volatility and fostered less-effective 
                                                          
18 Article 2(1) SADC Protocol on Trade. 
19 Article XXVI GATT. 
20 M. S. Leclair, Regional Integration and Global Free Trade: Addressing the Fundamental, (1997) at 1. 
21M. Schiff and A. Winters, Regional Integration and Development,(2003), World Bank Publication, at 50. 
22 Ibid at 50-51. 
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macroeconomic policies. According to Venables the relatively larger countries in a trade 
bloc attract the manufacturing sectors hence derive more benefits from the partnership.23 
According to Collier, integration between developing countries tends to benefit the richer 
countries in the trade blocs.24 So far, there is no consensus on this, and researchers have 
yet to reach definitive conclusions. However most agree that national borders present 
considerably greater impediments to regional integration than had previously been 
imagined. There is strength in countries trading in a bloc as they are better placed to 
influence trade terms in multilateral negotiations in the global market.  
              From the earlier discussions it is clear that the long term goal for both SADC 
and EAC extends beyond shallow integration and both aim to achieve deep integration. 
With it leads to the creation of other dynamics such as greater predictability of national 
policies which has two major benefits. Firstly it is essential to attracting foreign direct 
investments. Second, it facilitates political dialogue between partner states and 
strengthens their negotiating power in international arena.25 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
A notable feature of the framework for integration under AEC Treaty is the use of 
regional economic communities as building blocks for the continent wide community. 
Another feature is the conspicuous absence of an emphasis on the role of law in the 
economic integration process. The arguments raised in this paper rely on the appreciation 
of the role that law plays within the WTO system in regulating international trade 
relations. It is important to make sure that the trade agreements place effective restraints 
on every government’s behavior that fails to comply with trade commitments. It is argued 
that such a system of restraint works best if it is based on rules agreed to in advance and 
then applied to individual problems by neutral and objective adjudicators.26 This will help 
                                                          
23 A.J. Venables ‘Winners and losers from regional integration agreements’ (2003) Economic Journal at 
113. 
24 P. Collier (2008) ’The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It’ Oxford University Press (2008). 
25J. Whalley, ‘Why do countries seek Regional Trade Agreements?’ (1996) NBER Working Paper No. 
5552 at 20. 
26Hudec, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years’ (1999) 8 
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade. 
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ensure that the expectations of the parties are fulfilled.27 Relying on the good will of 
governments and GATT officials to reduce trade barriers and promote international trade 
was unlikely to succeed unless both substantive and procedural laws accompanied those 
objectives.  
              Secondly, another feature is reluctance of states to enforce regional agreements 
based on the fear that RTAs will jeopardize sovereignty. A variety of strategies have been 
adopted by countries seeking to safeguard their sovereignty. These include framing 
commitments in broad terms and retaining the authority to interpret the obligations. From 
a legal perspective, the parties concerned will not find it easy to comply with the 
obligations contained therein. When it comes to the promotion of economic integration, 
the governments involved have to decide some additional issues. How will they, for 
example, ensure non-discriminatory treatment and put a stop to nontariff barriers in the 
markets of the other states parties to the agreement? How will their national policies be 
affected? What happens in case of non-compliance? The answers to these questions 
should be provided for in the legal instruments in question.28 Community laws take the 
form of treaties establishing regional organizations, protocols, regulations, decisions, 
principles, objectives and general undertakings.29 States can also choose to establish 
institutions with weak central organs. Some governments are beginning to realize the 
need to relinquish sovereignty at times in order to promote economic development. A 
case in point is the EAC Treaty which grants sovereignty to the EAC institutions and 
organizations. 30 
              Thirdly, the more salient feature is the relation between community law and 
national law. The EAC Treaty elevates community law above national laws.31The SADC 
Treaty states that member states shall take all necessary steps to accord the Treaty the 
force of national law.32 This provision simply means that direct applicability of 
community law is not guaranteed. This provision has neither a defined time frame for the 
legislation to be enacted nor a sanction for non-compliance. This could mean that 
                                                          
27John Jackson, ‘World Trade and the Law of GATT’. 
28
 G. Erasmus,ʽIs the SADC trade regime a rules-based system?’(2011)SADC Law journal Vol 1 at 18. 
29 R. Oppong, Legal aspects of regional integration, (2011) chapter 7. 
30
 Article 8(4) EAC Treaty. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Article 6(5) SADC Treaty. 
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individual member states are free to apply different approaches in deciding how treaty 
provisions will be accommodated by national legal systems. While the EAC does not 
provide for direct applicability of community law, it however contains a provision that 
each partner state shall within twelve months from the date of signing of the treaty secure 
the enactment and the effective implementation of such legislation as is necessary to give 
effect to the treaty.33 
              Promotion of economic integration is at the heart of both EAC and SADC trade 
regime. Accordingly, the SADC and EAC instruments aim to stabilize and remove tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade and also harmonize customs duties and internal taxes. 
SADC has made significant progress in liberalizing trade. Most SADC countries have 
reduced and eliminated tariffs and quotas under the Protocol of trade. Two critical 
constraints seem evident. First, it is not very clear whether all members’ states remain 
committed to integration in such behind the border issues. Second, advancing on such 
regulatory integration appears to be constrained by overlapping membership of the 
majority of SADC countries in other regional initiatives that is the famous spaghetti bowl 
effect. While EAC has been successful in meeting its deadline for establishing a customs 
union, SADC has extended its period for launching its proposed customs union. Creation 
of a free trade area and a customs union confers tariff preferences between the members 
of the blocs concerned. Recent studies indicate that EAC and SADC been instrumental in 
promoting intra-regional trade and attracting foreign direct investments.34 However intra-
regional trade as a share of the total trade remains low compared to the levels observed in 
other continents.35 Low intraregional trade reflects limited progress towards 
implementing trade agreements, improving customs administration, cumbersome 
regulatory frameworks among other factors. EAC’s move to achieve deeper integration 
would require a higher degree of member states’ commitment to fulfill treaty objectives 
which in turn requires a stronger adherence to the rule of law. Whether the elimination of 
trade barriers results to increased trade is ultimately a question that is beyond legal 
                                                          
33 Article 8(2) EAC Treaty. 
34‘ Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development’ UNCTAD Economic 
Development in Africa Report ( June 2011) at 25 
35 ‘The State of Intra-African Trade and Investment’ UNCTAD Economic Development in Africa Report 
2013, pp 28-30 
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analysis. The role of the legal frame work is to create the necessary enabling environment 
for the conduct of trade by providing predictability and stability. This research aims to 
answer the following question: 
1. Whether the legal framework in the SADC and EAC  RTAs is effective to 
eliminate trade barriers and further foster a deeper level of economic integration? 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
For developing countries and in particularly African countries, economic integration is a 
response to mitigate effects of small size national markets.36 On one hand, it is seen as an 
opportunity for sustained growth of the economies.37 On the other hand, despite countries 
concluding RTAs, implementation of the ambitions expressed within the agreed 
schedules is not impressive and non tariff barriers still persist as major obstacles to 
trade.38  
              This study argues that African countries wishing to engage in regional 
integration should accept greater legal discipline in matters of International Trade law. 
The establishment of the RTAs introducing legal discipline will ensure that the trade 
regimes that they establish and participate in are effective. In order to be effective, it is 
contended that a legal measure must induce the kind of conduct desired and the desired 
conduct must in turn achieve the economic benefit desired.39 
1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Stakeholders in both public and private sector are keen to see the implementation of the 
trade liberalization objectives of both blocs so as to reap the benefits of integration. 
Implementation of the EAC customs union and the SADC free trade area has left a few 
gaps and stakeholders would like to see these gaps addressed to pave way for subsequent 
stages of integration. The significance of this study is that it attempts to answer some of 
the concerns regarding implementation and makes recommendations on the way forward. 
The extended period of implementation of reforms arises from institutional incapacity. It 
                                                          
36
 Economic Development in Africa Report’, UNCTAD 2013 at 50 
37 Article 3(1) Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. 
38 ‘Economic Development in Africa Report’, UNCTAD 2013 at 57 
39 R. E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, (2011) at 138 
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is important to note that the longer the time taken to introduce reform at institutional and 
regulatory levels, the longer the gains from trade liberalizations will be delayed. 
              Effective trade arrangements require legal instruments which reflect with 
sufficient degree of precision the intention of the parties with regard to the method of 
implementation and compliance. 40 The obligations which the members have accepted 
should be clear in order to ensure that the intended results are achieved. In order to 
engage in effective regional integration, it is important that the benefits that flow from 
regionalism are emphasized in the legal structure put in place to facilitate the 
achievement of those benefits. Lack of legal clarity is often encountered in the drafting of 
the RTAs, making such arrangements less effective. Uncertainty, unpredictability, non-
compliance, non-transparency and a lack of remedies will undermine the benefits to be 
gained.41 Private firms and traders are the most likely to be negatively affected. Investors 
will also shy away from markets where they do not enjoy the protection of the law and 
cannot enforce their rights. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The sources of research material will consist of both secondary and primary sources. 
Primary sources will include the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the East 
Africa Community Treaty, the East Africa Customs Union Protocol, the SADC Protocol 
on Trade, The SADC Treaty and other relevant regional trade agreements. 
              Secondary sources will be heavily relied on and include textbooks on 
international trade law, regional integration, articles and journals on international trade 
law, economic law and other related subjects.  
              Other information will be drawn from databases of inter-government institutions 
such as EAC and SADC websites respectively. Useful information will be drawn from 
official website of WTO, African Development Bank, UNCTAD etc 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The structure of the paper is as follows: 
                                                          





Chapter one  
This is an introductory chapter to the thesis. It will cover the background of the study, 
research question, research methodology, scope and relevance of the study. 
Chapter two  
This chapter will focus on the WTOs regulatory regime for regional integration. The 
analysis conducted in this chapter will involve an evaluation of Article XXIV. It will 
consider the legal provisions relating to the establishment of a free trade area and customs 
union.  The chapter aims to show that the provisions of Article XXIV are flexible enough 
to cater for the interests of developing countries. 
Chapter three 
This chapter will discuss the approaches adopted by EAC and SADC with regard to 
economic integration. This chapter will focus on the respective trade liberalization 
objectives particularly initiatives to facilitate free movement of goods. It will discuss the 
rules relating to elimination of tariff and rules of origin in that regards. This will be 
followed by a discussion of whether they have complied with their internal obligations to 
eliminate trade barriers. 
              The main focus will be on how successful both have been at implementing their 
tariff elimination agenda and to what extent their respective legal framework has helped 
to achieve this objective. This chapter will conclude that the potential benefits from these 
trade regimes will only be realized with effective compliance with commitments 
undertaken therein. It will be revealed that lack of legal clarity encountered in the 
drafting of these agreements creates uncertainty making such agreements less effective. 
Finally it will highlight the lessons to be drawn by SADC from the experience in EAC. 
Chapter four 
These chapters will analyze legal constraints facing the regional economic integration in 
both SADC and EAC. It will discuss the overall over view of the rules relating to 
elimination of non tarrif barriers (NTB) in the form of state imposed administrative and 
technical requirements that are an obstacle to free movement of goods. It will also 
examine the mechanisms contained in the legal instruments to secure compliance and 
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monitor implementation of agreed decisions. For compliance to be effective there is need 
for development of strong institutions that will uphold the rule of law even when political 
will fails. 
 Chapter five 
A conclusion will be drawn in regards to address the gaps in the legal structures put in 
place to promote economic integration. It will also include possible recommendations to 





2. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE WTO  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Trade in goods at the multilateral level is governed by the World Trade Organization’s 
General Agreement of Trade in Goods (GATT). The GATT is solely concerned with the 
promotion of free trade norms concentrating on the reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade. Although no text of the WTO framework contends that it is an 
international trade constitution, scholars have argued that it constitutes an international 
trade constitution having the capacity to provide an international legal framework of 
binding norms of substantive law, which have a significant impact on private individuals 
at domestic level.42 The GATT was originally intended to be an interim agreement 
pending the establishment of the International Trade Organization (ITO). Due to the 
failure to ratify the Havana Charter the GATT became a vehicle for international 
economic cooperation. With the growing complexity of the system, contracting parties 
met in Uruguay Round to come up with the Marrakesh Agreement. The agreement was 
signed in 1994 to establish the WTO. The WTO Charter adopted during the Uruguay 
Round gives the world a multi-lateral rule-based system of conducting trade that has a 
distinct legal personality.43 
              The legal authority governing formation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) at 
the multilateral level is Article XXIV GATT read together with the Understanding on 
Interpretation of Article XXIV. The two types of economic integration governed by the 
GATT are customs union (CU) and free trade area (FTA). This chapter starts by giving 
an overview of reasons why States pursue regionalism while they are still parties to the 
wider WTO multi-lateral system. It then proceeds to examine the WTO requirements for 
formation of regional economic integration. This is followed by a discussion of whether 
the SADC and EAC RTAs comply with the requirements for the establishment of a free 
trade area and customs union respectively.  
                                                          
42 G. Evans,  Lawmaking under the Trade Constitution: A study in Legislating by WTO   The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law, International (2000). 
43 Ibid. at 10. 
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2.2 REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM PERSPECTIVES. 
WTO rules regulate trading relations between states and in formulating trade policies 
states often have diverse policy goals such as achieving equity in the distribution of 
wealth and improving the overall quality of life of citizens.44 As there are many players 
all with different expectations, needs, agendas and capacities trade negotiations at the 
multi-lateral level have proved very problematic making decisions difficult to arrive at.  
The proponents of regionalism argue that the motivations driving governments towards 
regional arrangements reflect frustration with the paucity of multi-lateral negotiations.45 
While a number of trade issues are being negotiated on the multilateral level (i.e. the 
ongoing Doha trade negotiations of the WTO), the past decade saw an increase of trade 
negotiations taking place on the regional levels. As of 15th June 2014, 585 RTAs 
(counting both goods and services) had been notified to the WTO. Out of these 379 are in 
force.46The attraction to intra-regional trade liberalization is that, politically it may be 
easier for governments to liberalise among their neighbours than to do so multilaterally.47 
Nevertheless, the proliferation of RTAs should not be taken as an indication that they are 
replacing or substituting the multilateral trading system. The existence of a relationship 
between regionalism and multilateralism is very important for global trade governance. It 
can be argued that RTAs, by moving at a faster pace than WTO rules while sharing the 
WTO's goals, strengthens the latter.48 
              It also has to be realized that RTAs, being small in nature, can be more effective 
in tackling new areas such as services, investment and intellectual property protection, 
cooperation in competition policy, technical standards and government procurement than 
multilateral rule-making.49 As already stated in Chapter One, African countries have not 
been left out in the pursuit for regional integration. African countries have pursued 
                                                          
44 S Woolcock, ‘Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading System’ in Regional Trade Blocs, 
Multilateralism and the GATT. T Geiger and D Kennedy at 115. 
45
 Sutherland Report, ‘The future of the WTO’, World Trade Organization 2004, at 19 para. 61. 
46 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, accessed on 3rd July 2014. 
47Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration: Changing Paradigms for 
Developing Countries’, In C. Roe Goddard, Patrick Cronin and Kishore C. Dash (eds.), 
InternationalPolitical Economy: State-Market Relations in a Changing Global Order, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). at 403. 
48  J Bhagwati, Writings on international economics (2000) at 170. 
49Whalley, ‘Why do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements? ’,at 74. 
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regional integration to overcome development constraints that are characteristic of 
African economies, that is, small economic size, lack of structural complementaries 
manifested by low value primary export products and dependence on imports of 
intermediate and final goods. Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa 
have small markets, this makes domestic market diversification difficult. Economic 
integration has been pursued to transform Africa’s economies, to unleash industry and 
business and to assist the region become part of the world’s economy.50 
              The motivation for allowing RTAs is the recognition that their purpose is to 
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not raise barriers to trade to other 
WTO members who do not belong to that RTA.51One advantage of RTAs is that they 
allow freedom of trade through closer integration of the economies of the countries who 
are parties to such agreements.52Though regional integration initially works 
independently, it is perceived that at a certain point it will knock down protective barriers 
and open a path to not only regional but possibly global trade liberalization.53 
Regionalism when viewed in this manner, that is seeking to advance liberalization in 
areas where multilateral trade negotiations may have been exhausted, may well become a 
stepping stone for global trade liberalization.54 The Uruguay Round echoed the same 
when it concluded in the Preamble of the Understanding of the interpretation of Article 
XXVI, that closer integration between economies of the countries through voluntary 
agreement will contribute to the expansion of the world trade. 
2.3 SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
At the heart of the GATT is the principle of non-discrimination characterized by the 
most-favoured-nation (MFN).55 The MFN Clause is regarded as the central organizing 
rule of the GATT and the world trading system of rules it constituted.56 The MFN 
                                                          
50 ECA, ‘Annual Report on Integration in Africa (ARIA) 2002- Overview’ Paper presented at the African 
Development Forum III (Addis Ababa, 2002), at 3. 
51 Article XXIV para 4 GATT. 
52 Ibid. 
53Richard E. Baldwin, ‘The Causes of Regionalism’, Volume 20 No. 7, November 1997, at 865-888. 
54Ibid. at 883-885. 
55 Article 1 GATT 
56 Sutherland Report, ‘The future of the WTO’, World Trade Organization 2004, at 19. para. 58. 
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principle essentially requires that there should be equal treatment for all trading 
partners.57It requires that the best tariff conditions extended to any contracting party of 
the GATT had to be automatically and unconditionally extended to every other 
contracting party.58 FTAs and CUs by definition violate the MFN principle, since 
merchandise from FTA or CU member countries is given preferential tariff treatment 
compared to merchandise from non-member states. However, the negotiators behind the 
drafting had to compromise and include an exception to the MFN principle. RTAs are an 
exception to the general rule subject to compliance of certain conditions.  The two forms 
of RTAs recognized under the GATT are customs union and free trade areas. The RTAs 
have both external legal obligation that apply with relations with non-member countries 
and internal obligation that apply between members. 
              The underlying rationale behind Article XXIV was that the GATT would as a 
rule allow formation of an RTA but only as a reward for fully fledged liberalization in the 
form of either a customs union or an FTA among the constituent members. The formation 
of these agreements is allowed because they have been recognized to promote trade 
liberalization through the removal of barriers to substantially all the trade between 
members of such agreements. This purpose is reflected in the requirements for formation 
of customs union and free trade areas listed in paragraph (5) and (8) of Article XXIV of 
the GATT. Additionally these two types of RTAs are regarded as capable of helping 
developing economies implement domestic reforms and open up to competitive market 
pressures at sustainable pace thus facilitating their integration in the world economy.59 
2.3.1 External requirements for the formation of RTAs 
A decline of tariffs within the RECs may potentially have trade diversion effects (Viner 
1950). This will occur when partner states import relatively expensive goods from the 
growing industrial center rather than more efficient global producers thereby lowering 
their overall welfare. The exporting country will gain as regional industry relocates to its 
soil and real wages rise as a result. The net welfare impact will be positive if the trade 
                                                          
57 Article 1 GATT. 
58  Ibid 
59 J. Crawford and R. Firoentino  The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements   Discussion 
Paper No. 8 (WTO, 2005) available at www.wto.int/english/res-e/booksp-e/discussion-paper s 8-e.pdf, last 
assessed on 3rd July 2014. 
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creation effect dominates the trade diversion effect.60 This will likely happen if the bloc 
members are competitive and have diversified production structures. Recognizing the fact 
that some regional trade agreements may have trade diversion effects, Article XXIV (5) 
provides that members of RTAs should not raise import duties beyond those that existed 
before the formation of the RTAs on trade with other third countries.  
              Article XXIV (5) allows the establishment of a customs union if the duties and 
other regulations of commerce imposed upon its formation to trade with non-member 
states are not more restrictive than those applicable in the constituent territories before 
the customs union was formed.61This requirement was clarified in paragraph 2 of the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, indicating that 
evaluations in application of Article XXIV (5) (a) requires that it should be based upon 
an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of custom duties collected. 
Similarly the formation of FTAs is allowed provided the duties and other regulations of 
commerce maintained by each constituent state at the formation of the FTA to trade with 
non-members states shall not be higher or more restrictive than those existing in the same 
constituent territories before the FTA was formed.62 
2.3.2 Internal requirements for the formation of RTAs 
Article XXIV (8) lays out the internal requirements for the formation of CU and FTA 
with the goal of maximizing trade creation between the parties to the RTA through 
elimination of duties and other trade restrictions on trade within the RTA.A customs 
union is defined as a substitution of a single customs territory for two or more territories 
so that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated with respect to 
substantially all trade between the constituent territories.63An additional requirement for 
the custom union is the establishment of a common external trade regime with a common 
external tariff policy.64An FTA is defined as a group of two or more customs territories in 
which the duties and other regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all 
                                                          
60 Viner J (1950) The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York. 
61Article XXIV (5) (a) GATT. 
62Ibid. at para. 5 (b). 
63Ibid. at para. 8 (a) (i).  
64Ibid. at para. 8 (a)(ii). 
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trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.65 A 
FTA unlike a CU establishes only a standard for the internal trade between the 
constituent members and there is no requirement for the formation of a common external 
trade policy for trade with third countries. 
2.4 COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE XXIV OBLIGATIONS 
Under International law there is no hierarchy of treaties except for the supremacy of the 
provisions of the UN Charter over any other international Agreement which is expressly 
provided for in Article 103 of the UN Charter. Equating the supremacy of WTO rules 
over RTAs is possible if we take into account Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law on Treaties which is considered the customary law of treaties. Article 41 allows 
parties to a multi-lateral treaty to conclude a subsequent agreement that modifies the 
former treaty if the treaty itself allows for the possibility for such modification. Normally, 
an RTA would violate the WTO’s most-favoured nation principle, which essentially 
requires that there should be equal treatment for all trading partners.66 However, Article 
XXIV allows for the establishment of RTAs, provided they satisfy certain specified 
requirements. Since Article XXIV of the GATT allows the creation of RTAs, by virtue of 
Article 41(1), the latter kind of treaties are consistent with the provisions of the GATT 
subject to satisfying the specified requirements relating to establishment of CUs and 
FTAs. This means that RTAs are subservient to the rules of the WTO in the same manner 
as ordinary legislation of parliament in a domestic legal context would be to provisions of 
the constitution.67 Furthermore, WTO rules dealing with RTAs mandate that, if any 
contacting party enters into a custom union or FTA, they are obliged to notify the WTO 
promptly and make any such information to WTO members as may be necessary to make 
any appropriate recommendations.68Where the members of the notified RTA are not 
prepared to modify the proposed RTA, they will not be permitted to maintain such 
agreement or allow it to enter into force.69 
                                                          
65Ibid.at para. 8 (b). 
66 Article 1 GATT 
67 T. Cottier and M. Foltea,‘Constitutional Functions of the WTO and Regional Trade Agreements' at 43. 
68  Article XXIV par 7(a). 
69  Article XXIV par 7(b). 
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              Compliance with Article XXIV will be evaluated on the following basis: the 
substantially all trade requirement, the neutrality of trade restrictiveness requirement, the 
notification requirement, and the prescribed transitional period. 
2.4.1 The substantially all trade requirement 
The requirement that duties and other regulations of commerce must be eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the trade is very important in assessing the compliance of 
RTAs with WTO rules. What constitutes  substantially all trade  is vague and undefined. 
The term substantially suggests that some trade may be left out of a liberalization scheme 
or that a member country may keep in place some duties and other restrictive regulations 
of commerce. Ideally members of a custom union may maintain in their internal trade 
certain restrictive regulations of commerce that are permitted under Articles XI to XV 
GATT. The issue is to what extent member countries must remove barriers to trade in 
their internal trade liberalization programmes. An agreement on the interpretation of the 
term  substantially’ in the context of Article XXIV (8) has never been reached by the 
GATT contracting states.70This failure to agree on the definition of ‘substantially all the 
trade’ can be attributed to the desire of members to give themselves latitude to exclude 
sensitive sectors from trade liberalization. Article XXIV (8) offers some flexibility to the 
constituent members of a custom union and FTA when liberalizing their internal 
trade.71However the Appellate Body in the Turkey Textiles case warned that there is no 
scope to interpret this flexibility in a broad way because it must not be forgotten that the 
word  substantially’ qualifies the word  same’. Article XXIV (8) therefore requires 
something closely approximating  sameness’.72The traditionally favored approach to the 
interpretation of the phrase  substantially all trade   requirement is a quantitative 
approach.73 This approach focuses on a certain percentage typically between 80 and 90 
per cent of trade between member countries.  
              The East African Customs Union Protocol was signed on 2nd March 2004 after 
more than four years of protracted negotiations and became operational in 1st January 
                                                          
70 Panel Report, Turkey- Textile Case, para 9.148.  
71Ibid. para. 9.146. 
72 Appellate Body Report, Turkey- Textile Case, para 50. 
73 European Commission,  Clarification and Improvement to GATT Article XXIV Provisions. 
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2005.The elimination of duties to all merchandise trade among partner states was 
achieved in 2010 following the end of the 5 year transitional period. The establishment of 
a common external tariff (CET) in trade between partner states and third countries is 
essential to the formation of a customs union. The protocol establishes a three band 
common external tariff: a minimum rate of 0 per cent on raw materials, a middle rate of 
10 per cent for intermediate products and a maximum rate of 25 per cent rate for finished 
goods imported into the region from third countries.74The EAC CU has satisfied both the 
internal tariff elimination requirement and the common external tariff requirement. The 
adoption of the CET by the Partner States, ending the practice of partner states charging 
different national tariffs and observing the provisions of EAC customs protocol are 
expected to contribute significantly towards enhanced simplicity, rationalization, and 
transparency of EAC Partner States’ tariffs.75 
              The SADC Protocol on Trade was signed in 1996 and the implementation of the 
SADC FTA began in 2001. Since 2008 producers and consumers have paid no import 
tariffs on an estimated 85 per cent of intra-SADC merchandise trade with most of the 
remaining 15 per cent comprising sensitive products. This was only the minimum 
conditions for an FTA and the maximum tariff liberalization was to be achieved by 
January 2012, when the tariff phase-down process for sensitive products was expected to 
be completed.76 However for Mozambique, the process will only be completed in 2015 in 
the case of imports from South Africa. Since the substantially all trade requirement is not 
clear and the fact that SADC has reached an exceptional level of tariff elimination, this 
requirement has been complied with. Despite the fact that Angola, Seychelles and DRC 
are still in the process of joining the proposed free trade area, most commentators argue 
that SADC Trade Protocol is compliant with Article XXIV (8) b.77 
              In concluding this discussion, the study briefly considers the requirement on 
elimination of other regulations of commerce. It is important to realize that there are 
shortcomings in the interpretation of this requirement. An overall assessment of other 
                                                          
74 Article 12 EAC Customs Union Protocol. 
75 H.M. Stahl, ‘Tariff Liberalization impacts of the EAC Customs Union in perspective’, at 3 tralac 
Working Paper no. 4 (2005), www.tralac.org. 
76 ‘SADC Integration milestones’, available at, http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-
trade-area/  last assessed on 3rd July, 2014. 
77Grimett,  Protection and compliance  at 222. 
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regulations of commerce is difficult. This would require examining individual measures, 
regulations, products covered and trade flows for which qualification is difficult. For 
instance SADC member States are required to implement measures which will lead to the 
elimination of all existing forms of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).78 Accordingly member 
states must also refrain from imposing any new non-tariff measure. Similarly EAC 
member states are obliged to remove all existing non-tariff barriers and are prohibited 
from imposing new NTBs.79Although this shows a step towards elimination of NTBs on 
the part of SADC and EAC, the fulfillment of this requirement is difficult to measure as 
non-tariff barriers are still very high in both regions.80 
2.4.2 The neutrality of trade restrictiveness requirement 
The neutrality of trade restrictiveness requirement is contained in Article XXIV (5). This 
requirement is such that members of FTAs should not raise import duties beyond those 
that existed before the formation of the FTA on trade with other third countries. 
Paragraph 2 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV clarified that the 
duties to be taken into consideration are the applied rates of duties. In this respect the 
SADC member states have agreed not to raise import duties beyond those that were in 
existence before the Trade Protocol.81 They have also agreed not to grant less favorable 
treatment to third countries than they give to member states where export duties and 
quantitative export restrictions are applied. This shows compliance on the part of SADC 
with Article XXIV (5).  
              The next goal for SADC is the establishment of a customs union when all the 
member states’ tariff regimes are expected to be liberalized and a common external tariff 
adopted.82 The target schedule for formation of the SADC CU was 2010, however this is 
still pending.83 The main challenges facing the transition from an FTA to a CU can be 
attributed to the lack of efficient implementation of tariff liberalization provisions by 
                                                          
78Article 6 SADC Protocol on Trade. 
79 Article 13 EAC Customs Union Protocol. 
80 See discussion at 4.1 
81 Article 6 SADC Protocol on Trade. 
82 F. Njini,  SADC Limps Towards a Common Market,   Trade Law Centre for South Africa (13 August 
2010), available at www.tralac.org. 
83
 See Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2005- 2010, at 14. 
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members and the complexity created by multiple memberships of SADC member states 
in other RTAs with similar integration ambitions.84 
2.4.3 The notification requirement 
As the formation of a regional integration scheme is an exception to the MFN principle, 
member countries are required to notify the WTO their intention to form RTAs.  Article 
XXIV (7) (a) sets out the requirement for contracting parties that decide to enter into a 
CU or FTA. A party so deciding must notify the contracting parties and must make 
available to them any information regarding the proposed union or area. Though it does 
not expressly lay down any specific notification format to be followed by countries 
wishing to form a regional trading arrangement; the language used suggests that what is 
to be notified is prospective not retrospective. However in practice RTAs have been 
notified after their establishment. SADC notified WTO of its intention to form an FTA in 
August 200485 while the implementation of the SADC FTA actually began in 2000. The 
EAC trade regime was notified under Article XXIV GATT on 9th October 2000 and has 
since embarked its pursuit for regional economic integration. Based on state practice, it 
can be presumed that both SADC and EAC are have complied with the notification 
requirement.  
2.4.4 The prescribed transitional period for implementation 
The last requirement deals with the period of implementation. The period between the 
entry into force of an RTA and complete liberalization between its members is called an 
interim agreement. Under Article XXVI (5) (a), an interim agreement should include 
provisions for the formation of CU or FTA within a reasonable time. In the 
Understanding on Article XXIV, the reasonable period of time is ten years which can be 
extended in exceptional cases.86SADC implemented the minimum conditions for the 
establishment of the FTA after 8 years of phased tariff reduction. This is two years earlier 
than the specified limit. Notwithstanding the fact that a few members of SADC are not 
party to the FTA, its implementation in 8 years (from 2000 to 2008) means that those 
who had not implemented it had a grace period of two years and 2010 was the final year 
                                                          
84 Ibid at 34. 
85See Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2005- 2010, at 16. 
86 Understanding on Article XXIV, para. 3. 
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for the fulfillment of this requirement. SADC can still seek to extend the transitional 
period by approaching the Council of Trade in Goods. This should be done in line with 
the decision by Mozambique to have fully complied with the FTA by 2015. The EAC on 
the other hand has complied with this requirement as the East African Customs Union 
Protocol which entered into force in 1st January 2005 operated as a fully fledged customs 
union from 1st January 2010 following the end of the 5 year transitional period. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
All the member states in SADC and EAC are WTO members as well. Being WTO 
members they are obliged to comply with the multilateral requirements for RTAs. As 
observed in this chapter, though the provisions of Article XXIV may seem vague, it 
cannot be said to be meaningless and not capable of compliance. In so far as EAC is 
concerned, compliance with Article XXIV requirements regarding the formation of a 
customs union has been satisfied. Similarly, SADC FTA has indeed complied with the 
free trade area requirements set out in the WTO rules. If SADC envisages deeper 
integration, efforts should be made to ensure compliance with the requirements regarding 
formation of a customs union. The launch of the EAC Customs Union by 2010 and the 
launch of the SADC FTA by 2008 are benchmarks against which members’ compliance 
can be assessed.  This progress raises the demand for legal certainty and uniformity in 
interpretation and application of the community law which creates the need for 





3. COMPLIANCE WITH REGIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO ELIMINATE TRADE 
BARRIERS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one it was observed that regional economic integration has been recommended 
to, and embraced by, African countries as the key to improved trade performance and 
economic development. While chapter two considered compliance of the RTAs with the 
external trade (multilateral) obligations, this chapter will consider whether they have 
complied with their internal legal obligations to eliminate trade barriers on intra-regional 
trade. These internal obligations are found in their own legal instruments and apply 
between the members themselves. The potential benefits from these trade regimes will 
only be realized with effective implementation of regional commitments to eliminate 
trade barriers.87 In order to assess the level of compliance of the trade rules established by 
EAC and SADC, it is important to consider the trade liberalization objectives that have 
driven economic integration in both blocs. Knowledge of the regime’s trade liberalization 
objectives permits an accurate judgment to be made as to the effectiveness of the 
regime.88 This chapter will evaluate the trade liberalization process in SADC and EAC. It 
will start with an overview of the historical background and proceed to consider the trade 
liberalization objectives. This will involve a discussion of the provisions relating to 
elimination of tariffs and rules of origin in that regards. This chapter will examine the 
level of compliance with the commitments to eliminate tariff barriers in the Customs 
Union Protocol and the Protocol on Trade respectively. It will conclude that for economic 
integration to be effective, member states must ensure that national implementation 
should be in line with the community aspirations. Uncoordinated executive practices of 
member states and insufficient harmonization of national laws result in fragmented 
outcomes, legal uncertainty and administrative duplication.   
                                                          
87 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (2003) at 25. 




3.2 HISTORY AND THE TRADE LIBERALIZATION OBJECTIVES IN THE 
EAC AND SADC 
Immediately after decolonization, almost all the development resolutions adopted by the 
OAU called for ‘the economic integration of Africa as a prerequisite for real 
independence and development.89 The Abuja treaty provided for the creation of five 
RECs in the five regions recognized by the OAU that is North, West, Central, East and 
Southern Africa.90 The motivation for establishing RECs under the Abuja Treaty was to 
use them as building blocks for the eventual continental Economic Community. The 
OAU was replaced by the Africa Union (AU) in 2001. The AU builds on and accelerates 
the aim of the OAU and the Abuja Treaty. 91 
              In East Africa, regional integration initiatives date back to 1919 when the former 
EAC Customs Union between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania existed. However this 
community lasted only until 1977 when it collapsed among disputes over the distribution 
of benefits from integration as well as fundamental political differences.92 The new EAC 
was established in 1999 with the signing of the EAC Treaty and entered into force in July 
2000. Initially the community consisted of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, but 
subsequently extended to include Burundi and Rwanda in 2007. Both EAC and SADC 
adopted the market model of integration, though the EAC arrangement is unique in the 
sense that, rather than adopting the progression described in the economics literature93, 
which involves a move from a free trade area (FTA) to a customs union and then to a 
common market, the FTA and customs union stages in the EAC were implemented 
simultaneously.  
              Article 5 of the EAC Treaty sets out the objectives of the community as follows: 
to develop policies and programs aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among 
member states for the mutual benefit in the political, economic, social and cultural fields, 
research and technology, legal and judicial affairs. To achieve these objectives partner 
states have undertaken to establish among themselves a customs union, a common 
                                                          
89 Article 2 Charter of the Organization of the African Unity. 
90 Article 1(d) Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. 
91 Article 3, Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
92 J. M. Kikwete ‘Regional Alternatives and National Options’ in OECD, Regional Integration in Africa 
(OECD) Publications, (2002) at 151- 153. 
93 B. Balassa, ‘the theory of economic integration. Homewood, ILL: Richard D Irwin. Inc ‘(1996) at 2. 
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market, a monetary union and, ultimately a political federation.94 The EAC’s trade 
liberalization strategy is set out in Chapter 11 of the EAC Treaty. The first step involves 
the establishment of a customs union which involves elimination of duties in respect of 
all merchandise trade within the territory95 and the establishment of a common external 
tariff applicable to trade between member states and third parties. Once this was 
achieved, the next step will be the formation of common market.96 
              Regional integration in Southern Africa was formalized in 1980 with the 
formation of the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which 
was an initiative of the frontline states.97  SADCC was initially directed towards the 
political liberalization of the region and reduce dependence on the then apartheid era in 
South Africa. Most of the countries of Southern Africa ultimately achieved political 
independence, but against a background of mass poverty, economic backwardness and 
the threat of powerful white minority ruled neighbors. Economic and social development 
through regional integration was regarded as the next logical step after political 
independence. The SADC Treaty which came into force in 1992 established the South 
Africa Development Community (SADC) transforming SADCC into SADC. The 
objective shifted to include economic integration.98 SADC currently consists of fifteen 
members including Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagscar, Malawi, Mauritus, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
              Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, sets out the economic objectives of SADC as 
follows: to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth, alleviate poverty and 
enhance the standard and quality of life of the people through regional integration; to 
achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment; maximize productive employment and utilization of the region’s resources 
among others. The region sought to achieve its goals of regional co-operation and 
integration through implementing the SADC Trade Protocol on Trade. The Protocol on 
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Trade which establishes the SADC trade regime is actually older than the EAC Treaty 
having been signed in 1996. It came into force four years later in 2000 after it had been 
ratified by twelve out of the fifteen members of SADC.99 It seeks to promote 
liberalization of intra-regional trade in goods and services; based on fair, mutually 
equitable, and beneficial trade arrangements; to enhance economic development of the 
region and the creation a Free Trade Area covering the member states.100 Although the 
SADC Treaty and the SADC Trade Protocol does not contain a scheduled strategy for 
economic integration, the strategy is set out in the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003. This strategic plan articulates the roadmap for 
SADC’s integration and provides for the establishment of a free trade area by 2008, a 
customs union by 2010, a common market by 2015, monetary union by 2016 and the 
introduction of a single currency by 2018.101 Although the RISDP is not a legally binding 
instrument, it enjoys significant political legitimacy as the strategic plan for SADC 
integration. 
3.3 THE REGULATION OF TARIFF BARRIERS WITHIN THE EAC CU 
Free movement of goods is a principal element in a customs union. The free movement of 
goods between member states generally requires the creation of a free trade area within 
which tariffs imposed on goods originating within the area (as defined in rules of origin) 
are eliminated.102 This is because import tariffs increase the cost of imported goods hence 
providing protection to domestic producers of identical or substitutable goods. Intra-
African trade is still faced with relatively high tariffs.103 High tariffs reduce consumer’s 
welfare enhancing opportunities, arising from access to reasonably priced regional 
imports. Market access conditions are not only determined by tariffs but also non-tariff 
barriers. For this reason the drafters of the EAC Customs Union Protocol included 
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provisions for the elimination of customs duties104; the elimination on non-tariff barriers 
(NTB)105 and the establishment of a common external tariff.106 
3.3.1 Tariff elimination in EAC  
The Customs Union Protocol envisaged that the move towards a fully-fledged customs 
union with free circulation of goods was to be gradual and be attained within a 
transitional period of 5 years from 2005.107 The EAC treaty focused on achieving deep 
integration through a series of incremental steps based on the principles of variable 
geometry. This principle allows for progression in co-operation among groups within the 
community at different integration speeds. 108 The justification for this principle is based 
on the understanding that the EAC Partner States are at different levels of economic 
development and that the existing imbalances, which could be exacerbated by the 
customs union, need to be addressed. Keeping up with this principle, the partner states 
agreed that goods to and from Uganda to Tanzania shall be subject to immediate duty 
free treatment.109 Goods from Uganda and Tanzania into Kenya shall be duty free.110 
However goods from Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania were grouped into two categories. 
Category A, goods were eligible for immediate duty free treatment.111 Category B goods 
from Kenya were subject to gradual tariff elimination phase out over a five year 
period.112  
              The main features of a Customs Union include: duty-free and quota-free 
movement of goods among the partner states; elimination of internal tariffs and other 
charges of equivalent effect and the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) to 
be levied upon imports from third parties (countries outside the region).113  Achieving 
this will require simplification and harmonisation of trade documentation and procedures; 
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114a common valuation method for tradable goods for tax (duty) purposes115 and customs 
cooperation. Accordingly, the implementation of the EAC custom union has progressed 
with internal tariffs having been eliminated. Many policies, standards, regulation, 
procedure and practices have been harmonized and some are still in the process. 
Consensus has been reached on various areas which include common commodity, 
description and coding system116; common rules of origin and the regulation on free ports 
and common export promotion schemes. Further, the member states are applying a 
common external tariff (CET) applicable on trade with third parties. Since the start of the 
EAC custom union in 2005, trade in the region has been growing very rapidly. The total 
intra-trade in 2007 between the original member states (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) 
increased by 22 per cent reaching the value of USD 1 973.2 (EAC Trade Report 2008).  
In addition, total tax revenues have been increasing in all partner states despite the initial 
fears that implementation of the CET would negatively affect government revenues. This 
is partly attributed to improved trade and economic performance coupled with better 
customs administration at national levels.  
              The tariff liberalization in respect to intra-regional trade within the anticipated 
deadline is quite impressive and was followed by the launching of the common market in 
July 2010. The consolidation of the EAC Customs Union shall provide a springboard for 
the implementation of the Common Market. The objective of EAC's Common Market is 
to operate a single market with common trade laws, common taxes and critically, the free 
movement of labour, capital, goods and services.117 Free movement of factors of 
production under the Common Market builds on the free movement of goods under the 
Customs Union. 
3.3.2 EAC Rules of Origin 
Rules of Origin are an essential feature of free trade agreements because they are used to 
determine the goods that are eligible for preferential treatment.118 In a single customs 
territory, goods move either from one member state to another or they enter the territory 
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from a third country. Goods coming from a third country are subject to the CET and 
therefore do not require any rules of origin. When these goods are exported to another 
member state they do not require any rules of origin as they have already been subjected 
to the CET. Though fully fledged customs unions do not require rules of origin, the EAC 
requires these rules due to the progressive nature of the integration and the many 
exceptions to the CET.119About 59 products are termed as sensitive products and are 
exempt from the CET. 120 Sensitive products may be imported at specific tariff levels that 
are higher than 25 per cent but lower than WTO tariff bindings.121 The EAC Customs 
Union Protocol provides that the goods are eligible for community tariff treatment only if 
they originate in the Partner States.122 The EAC Rules of Origin sets out four criteria 
under which goods can be accepted as originating in member states. The first criterion 
categorises, goods that are wholly produced in partner states.123 The second criterion 
categorizes goods produced wholly or partially from material imported from outside the 
partner states where the cost insurance and freight (CIF) value of the imported materials 
does not exceed 60 per cent of the total cost of the materials used.124 The third criterion 
categorises goods produced wholly or partially from imported material whose value 
added accounts for at least 35 per cent of the goods ex-factory cost.125 The fourth criteria 
categorises goods that are classified under a tariff heading other than that under which 
they were imported.126 
              Though these rules appear to be straight forward, they have raised disputes over 
their application. For example, Tanzania did not allow motor vehicles assembled in 
Kenya to enter Tanzania duty free on the ground that requirements of the rules of origin 
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were not satisfied.127 Uganda and Tanzania have been accused of imposing a higher local 
content requirement for tobacco exports. They demand that 70 per cent and 75 per cent 
respectively of the inputs into tobacco exports must be from the exporting state.128 This 
requirement is inconsistent with EAC rules of origin that requires 35 per cent of local 
input for goods to qualify as originating from a member state. Another issue is that goods 
that originate from other partner states even if qualifying under rules of origin attract 
indirect taxes such as VAT and excise across the borders hence are subject to the same 
customs clearance processes like any other goods from outside the region. EAC members 
are yet to fully implement provisions relating to harmonization of customs procedures, 
other charges on imports to fully realize the intra-regional trade liberalization objective. 
3.4 REGULATION OF TARIFF BARRIERS WITHIN SADC FTA 
3.4.1 Tariff elimination in SADC 
Similarly the SADC Protocol on Trade provides for the elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers in intra-SADC trade.129 The initiative to reduce tariffs began in 2001 and 
envisaged the establishment of the SADC FTA by 2008.130 The minimum condition for 
the FTA was attainment of duty free treatment upon 85 per cent of intra-regional trade 
among the member states with the remaining 15 per cent comprising of sensitive goods. 
The elimination of tariffs was to be implemented in stages in a process termed as tariff 
phase downs, with the more developed countries dismantling at a faster rate. The 
programme devised by member states provided for the five SACU states131 to take the 
lead in removing their tariffs.  
              The elimination process grouped the types of goods into four categories in which 
tariffs would be dismantled. The tariffs for category A goods were subjected to 
immediate duty free at the time of the phase down process i.e. in 2000.132 Category B 
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products were subject to tariff phase-down to be completed over an eight year period 
until 2008.133 Category C products constituted sensitive products (i.e. products that are of 
unique economic importance to a country and are protected from competition with 
similar foreign goods) and were subject to a 12 year tariff phase down period to be 
completed in 2012.134 Category E products were excluded for preferential trade such as 
gold, precious stones, firearms and munitions.135 A special agreement on trade in Sugar 
was adopted as sugar has been one of the sensitive products and is susceptible to political 
and domestic influence in the world’s sugar producing countries including SADC.136 This 
allows non-SACU SADC sugar producers to have non-reciprocal market access based on 
duty free quotas to the SACU market.137 The full liberalization of trade in sugar was to be 
achieved in 2012.138 However, this is still pending and the sugar arrangement is still in 
force. 
              SADC pursued a tariff elimination programme at variable scales of speed in 
which members were categorized as Developed139, Developing140 and Least 
Developed.141 Countries in the ‘developed’ category were expected to achieve zero tariffs 
within five years except for sensitive products. 142 Countries in the ‘developing’ category 
were expected to achieve the same threshold within an eight year implementation period. 
The LDC were permitted to achieve their tariff reduction beyond the eight year 
implementation period but not exceed 12 years.143 The Trade Protocol adopted the 
principle of asymmetry in terms of tariff reductions to address the needs of less 
developed member states and ensure a win win situation prevails.144 
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              SADC member states began implementing the Trade Protocol in 2001 and 
envisaged the establishment of a Free Trade Area by 2008 when 85 per cent of intra-
SADC merchandise trade was expected to be duty-free with most of the remaining 15 per 
cent comprising sensitive products which was scheduled to be liberalized by 2012.145 
SACU countries completed their tariff elimination by 2008.146 This can be attributed to 
the fact that SACU countries as members of a customs union, already had a eliminated 
their tariffs within the customs union, thus for them to eliminate the tariffs for the 
purpose of the SADC FTA was less cumbersome in comparison with the procedure 
entailed for other members. Mozambique negotiated to complete its reduction of tariffs to 
imports from South Africa by 2015. Zimbabwe was granted derogation (in terms of 
Article 3(c) of the Protocol) to suspend tariff elimination commitments on sensitive 
products until 2012 and to be completed by 2014. Although Tanzania was on schedule 
with its tariff commitments, the government applied for derogation to levy a 25 per cent 
import duty on sugar and paper products until 2015 to allow for domestic industries to 
take measures to adjust.147 Malawi confirmed being on schedule with respect to its tariff 
phase down offer to the rest of SADC except to South Africa where it stood at around 86 
per cent.148 
              The SADC Trade Protocol has been a key legal instrument to the reduction of 
tariff barriers within the region. The tariff phase-down commitments have largely been 
implemented however some members are not fully compliant with their commitments.149 
The difficulties being experienced by some countries can be attributed to fear of tariff 
revenue loss. Another challenge is the fear of South Africa’s competitiveness and 
concerns about protecting infant industries. To cater for this challenges, the Protocol has 
contains provisions for application of safeguard measures150 and infant industry 
protection measures.151 As observed above, member states have opted to invoke Article 3 
(1)(c) of the Trade Protocol which allows derogations from trade liberalization 
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commitments in so as far tariffs and non-tariff barriers are concerned. As such, the 
derogation clause has the potential to undermine the overall tariff liberalization objective. 
The fact that all countries are involved in the process of tariff elimination, any derogation 
will effectively interfere with the principle of reciprocity operating between SADC 
members. The Trade Protocol is flawed by the general terms of Article 3 which itself fails 
to set out the criteria to be considered in determining whether the derogation being sought 
is necessary. This gives the Committee of Ministers of Trade discretion to decide each 
application on a case by case basis, instead of being guided by a clear and transparent 
procedure that is applicable to all Article 3 applications. 
              The SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 
envisaged the establishment of a SADC Customs Union by 2010 however the target was 
not met and has been postponed from time to time. Convergence of the individual 
country specific tariffs into a common external tariff (CET) will require that SADC 
countries harmonize their tariff policies. This remains a challenge given the varying level 
of the economic development of individual countries within the region. The rationale for 
tariff policies is not the same for all SADC members. Some use tariffs as an industrial 
policy instrument to protect their sensitive industrial sectors, a few use lower tariffs as a 
vehicle for their integration into the global economy and most members rely on tariffs to 
generate revenue for public purposes.152 Hence negotiating a CET will face challenges of 
balancing different revenue interests of member states.153 
3.4.2 SADC Rules of Origin 
In an FTA, rules of origin have an additional function since individual countries have 
varying external tariffs. The rules of origin prevent a situation where imports from third 
parties would be able to enter an FTA through the country with the lowest external tariff 
before moving to other FTA members (referred to as trade deflection).154 The second 
purpose is to encourage certain regional activities or to protect them from potential 
competition arising from the formation of the preferential trade regime (the protective 
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function).155 Under the protective view, ROO are seen as an instrument to promote 
development by forcing producers to source inputs in the region in order to qualify for 
regional trade preference. The design of the ROO should aim to find balance so that only 
members of the FTA benefit from preferential market access while allowing for 
flexibility in input sourcing to promote efficiency and competitiveness.  
              The SADC rules of origin provide for two different criteria under which 
products can be considered as originating in a member state. The first criterion 
categorises goods that have been wholly produced in any member state.156Rule lists the 
products which shall be regarded as wholly produced in the member states. The second 
criterion categorises goods that have been produced wholly or partially from imported 
materials provided such materials have undergone sufficient working or process within 
the meaning of paragraph 2 of this rule.157 Paragraph 2 sets out the conditions to be 
fulfilled by such products. The current SADC rules of origin are more restrictive as they 
are more product and process specific than the simpler value added criterion that is used 
in the EAC Customs Union. While significant tariff liberalization on intra-SADC trade 
suggests free access for most products, these zero tariffs apply only to imports satisfying 
the SADC rules of Origin158. It is argued that complex rules of origin will seriously 
impede regional integration in SADC even when tariff barriers to intra-SADC trade 
disappear (Flatters 2002). 
              The effect of complex and restrictive rules of origin deprive producers of access 
to raw materials from low cost international sources and hence can raise the cost of 
producing a product for sale in the FTA.159 A recent UNCTAD report revealed that 
onerous local content requirements in ROO has adverse trade effects in the clothing and 
textile industries that use inputs not produced in the region (e.g. fabrics).160 For garments 
to qualify for SADC preference the rules require that both the fabric and garment have to 
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be manufactured in a SADC member state. With very little textile manufacture in this 
region, the rules adversely limit trade in garments in the SADC region. The high 
compliance costs with administrative certificates of origin reduce the utilization of tariff 
preference.  
              A recent audit on the implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol highlighted 
the grievances of most members states regarding the complexity of the SADC rules of 
origin that make them difficult to apply.161A major implication of the complex rules of 
origin is that some traders when faced with stringent rules of origin chose to forego the 
preferential rate on offer in favour of the MFN rate. For example Woolworths does not 
use SADC preferences at all in sending consignments of food and clothing to its franchise 
stores in non-SACU SADC markets. It simply pays full MFN tariffs because it deems the 
process of administering ROO documentation to be too costly. Estimates indicate that in 
2010 it could have benefited from duty savings of US$ 0.6 million on exports to 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia a saving cost on imports for franchise holders in 
these markets of up to 19 per cent and a strong incentive to source more of its products 
regionally. 162 To reduce tariffs on regional trade only to replace them with restrictive 
rules of origin undermines the benefits of trade liberalization. This calls for reforms to 
review the current rules of origin and come up with rules that are more practical for the 
region. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Economic integration is essential for economic development in both Eastern Africa and 
Southern Africa regions.163 Given the small economies with small domestic markets, the 
creation of an integrated economic space can facilitate efficiencies in production, 
investment and trade thus increasing the welfare of the people.164 It is anticipated that the 
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lifting of tariffs will lower costs and lead to an increase of overall welfare.165 Both EAC 
and SADC have made significant progress towards tariff elimination. It was observed 
that whereas EAC member states have completed internal elimination of tariffs, the 
process is still ongoing within SADC. The relatively faster pace at which EAC is 
progressing can be attributed to a number of factors. These include its size, political 
stability enjoyed by the member states, the strong bond that existed between the member 
during the days of the old East Africa Community and the existence of clear trade 
liberalization obligations as set out in its Customs Union Protocol. A harmonized 
customs legal regime comprised of a common tariff structure, a uniform EAC Customs 
Management Act and Rules of Origin and Customs Regulations were adopted for 
uniform application in all partner states. On the other hand, the SADC Trade Protocol is 
flawed by back-loaded and different tariff reduction schedules.166 In addition the structure 
of the tariff phase down arrangement is complicated by product-specific rules of origin. 
The proposed SADC Customs Union could use the EAC the Customs Union Protocol as 
a model structure to develop its Customs Union legislation. In addition, more flexible 
rules of origin that require lower thresholds should be adopted by SADC.  
              EAC is ahead of SADC in terms of complete tariff elimination and the adoption 
of the CET. The effective implementation of the SADC FTA will be a stepping stone for 
the establishment of the Customs Union. The establishment of the SADC Customs Union 
will require supra-national institutions put in place to manage a common external tariff. 
Following a summit decision in 2005, each EAC member has established a Ministry for 
EAC affairs responsible for implementation of EAC programs in each member state. 
Their role is to be the focal point for each partner state’s EAC related activities. This 
model integrative structure can be replicated by SADC states.  
              Although internal tariff elimination has been completed within the EAC and 
member states have adopted a CET, free circulation of goods is yet to be achieved. The 
Single Customs Territory whose aim is to overcome the slow movement of goods is yet 
to be fully operational. Goods moving from one partner state to another have to undergo 
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customs procedure to enforce standards and collect domestic taxes on goods. 167 Internal 
customs border controls still exist and the new rules of origin are not being applied 
uniformly.168 The EAC Customs Union is being overseen by a Customs and Trade 
Directorate at the secretariat at the central level, but its implementation is being done by 
the respective national Revenue Authorities through a decentralised structure. At the 
moment, each partner state has opted to continue clearing its goods. Even then, national 
institutions clothed with authority to administer the customs union are obliged to do so in 
accordance with the objectives of the Treaty as if they were institutions of the 
community.169 The success of the single customs territory will require development of 
strong institutions that uphold the rule of law necessary to drive forward the integration 
vision. The next chapter will analyze the regional institutions established by the 
respective RECs put in place to reinforce compliance with economic integration 
objectives. 
  
                                                          
167 ‘Attainment of a single customs territory in a fully fledged customs union for the EAC’ Final Report 
(2012) at 3 
168 ‘Single Customs Territory still a document on the shelf as 1st July deadline lapses’, The East African 
News, available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Single-Customs-Territory-July-1-deadline-lapses-
/-/2558/2373012/-/yn0tcd/-/index.html, last assessed on 10th August 2014. 





4. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS FACING TRADE LIBERALIZATION  
4.1 NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 
Though tariff liberalization in both blocs is impressive there is slow progress in the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers. Tariffs are undeniably an important trade barrier but 
non-tariff barriers should not be underestimated. Intra-regional trade faces obstacles 
arising from several NTBs erected by partner states. Both RTAs provide that member 
states should refrain from imposing non-tariff barriers.170 How states will implement this 
provision is unclear and the vague language in this provision could provide the basis for a 
range of actions. Translating this provision into reality has been a slow process. In 
practice member states continue to violate their obligation to eliminate and refrain from 
imposing non-tariff barriers.  
4.1.2 Elimination of non-tariff barriers in EAC 
Though the region has proceeded to launch a common market, it still faces persistent 
non-tariff barriers which hamper free circulation of goods within the territory.171 For the 
common market to be effective there is need for members to eliminate non-tariff barriers. 
Some of these barriers existed before the coming into force of the common market and 
ought to have been removed, while others were later imposed despite the existence of a 
legal obligation for members to refrain from imposing new NTBs. Article 13(1) of the 
EAC CU Protocol provides for the removal of all the existing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
imposed on goods originating from other member states, and thereafter member states are 
obliged to refrain from imposing any new NTBs. To ensure this policy was implemented, 
a mechanism for monitoring the removal of NTBs was to be formulated.172 As a means of 
combating NTBs, and pursuant to Article 13 of the Protocol, a system known as the 
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Monitoring Mechanism for the Elimination of Non-tariff Barriers in EAC has been 
developed jointly by the EAC and East African Business Council Secretariats.173 
              In practice, NTBs still exist and constitute a major impediment that obstructs 
free movement of goods across borders. The reported NTBs are in the form of Customs 
and Administrative entry procedures, Technical Barriers to trade, Sanitary and Phyto-
Sanitary Measures and Specific limitations such as import regulations.174 The implication 
of the various NTBs on regional trade is that they impose unnecessary costs for producers 
that limit trade. Delays caused by cumbersome port administrative procedures create a 
bottleneck to fast and efficient clearance of imports and exports. Another category of 
NTBs relates to standards and technical requirements. Ideally, TBT and SPS measures 
may be maintained by the importing country and are aimed at achieving legitimate 
objectives such as protection of human, plant and animal health.175 In applying technical 
regulations, members are prohibited from treating imported products less favourably than 
like domestic products.176 When these standards and technical requirements are imposed 
unilaterally to protect local industry, they can have a severe restrictive impact on trade 
which defeats the aspiration to have the EAC operate as a single market with free 
movement of goods. A recent report revealed that the Standard Bureau of EAC member 
states have varying procedures for issuance of certification and marks, inspection and 
testing.177 For example the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) has for a long 
time maintained cumbersome testing procedures for food imports into Tanzania. Uganda 
accused Kenya of discriminating against its sugar by demanding its exporters be licensed 
by the Kenya Sugar Board. Uganda too has maintained an import ban on beef products 
from Kenya for a long while on the grounds that it is an SPS measure.178  The Partner 
States agreed to take measures, including introducing regulations that would ensure that 
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products once accepted in one Partner State are also accepted in the market of the other 
Partner States.179 Following a recent meeting of the Sectoral Council, the final draft East 
African Standards were approved and declared EAC Standards.180 Member states were 
urged to engage their national bureaus of standards to adopt the East African standards 
and refrain from applying existing national standards within 6 months as prescribed by 
the SQMT Act.181 The regional effort to harmonize standard is a step forward to ensure 
that the differences in national standards do not restrict trade. 
              The current online mechanism for NTB reporting system is an important 
transparency mechanism.182 The framework monitors the existence of NTBs and suggests 
ways through which they can be eliminated. This mechanism has helped in reducing 
NTBs though the process of resolving NTBs is slow as it does not have powers to 
sanction organs of the state that introduce an NTB. There is need for development of a 
legally binding enforcement mechanism on the elimination of identified non-tariff 
barriers. This will work best in a rule based system which will determine whether a non-
tariff measure adopted by a member state is necessary to achieve a legitimate public 
policy such as health, consumer safety, environmental protection and other related 
concerns verses those that are simply protecting local businesses from competition and 
impose unjustified barriers on trade. Such a system should contain an enforcement 
mechanism that would impose penalties for non-compliance.  
4.1.3 Elimination of non-tariff barriers in SADC 
While tariff elimination has been largely achieved, the challenge remains with the 
elimination of NTBs. The legal position in SADC regarding elimination of non-tariff 
barriers is similar to that of the EAC. Member states are urged to adopt policies and 
implement measures to eliminate all existing forms of NTBs and refrain from imposing 
any new ones.183 One of the flaws of such a provision is that members retain the 
discretion to adopt measures to eliminate NTBs instead of being guided by a clear 
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procedure. The Protocol also contains a wide range of provisions relating to Phyto-
Sanitary (SPS) measures,184 Technical barriers to trade (TBT)185 and quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports186 generally benchmarked to WTO disciplines in these 
areas. WTO rules requires that SPS and TBT measures are not applied in manner that 
creates unnecessary obstacles to international trade.187 For a TBT measure to be deemed 
necessary to achieve its legitimate objective, it must be based on international 
standards.188 For SPS measures to be deemed necessary for the protection of human, 
animal and plant health they should either conform to international standards189 or be 
based on scientific principles.190Despite the existence of a similar legal requirement to 
base SPS and TBT measures on international standards191, standard regimes are still 
characterized by an over-reliance on inspections, certification requirements based on 
national rather than regional or international standards. In most of the member states 
there is are often no procedures by which technical procedures are assessed to ensure 
their consistency with public policy objectives. Consequently technical standards and 
regulations create unnecessary barriers to trade especially when applied in a 
discriminatory manner against imports that go beyond issues of purely public interest. 
For instance the environmental levy on plastic bags in South Africa was introduced to 
reduce problems associated with litter, but the technical regulation governing it also 
affects unrelated issues such as the minimum thickness of the plastic to be used as well as 
the size of the text that must be printed on the bags.192 This is contrary to the legal 
requirement that members should specify technical regulations in terms of performance 
rather than design or descriptive characteristics.193  
The provision on protection of infant industry found in Article 21 is a potentially 
dangerous exception. It allows for the possibility of temporary measures to promote 
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infant industries by suspending trade liberalization objectives.194 It fails to set out criteria 
of determining what constitutes an infant industry. It also fails to specify a maximum 
time limit for which such protection should be granted. All this major decisions are left to 
the discretion of the Committee of Ministers of Trade (CMT) to decide on a case to case 
basis instead of being guided by a clear and transparent procedure applicable to all such 
applications.195 Another form of non-tariff barrier is the SADC restrictive rules of origin, 
which was already discussed in the previous chapter.196  
              The Trade Protocol does not go further to provide for concrete measure and 
guidelines to eliminate NTBs. This could be the reason why member states have 
continued to impose NTBs. This is evidenced from the online web-based mechanism 
which has been developed to monitor and report NTBs.197 The online NTB Monitoring 
Mechanism is a major step forward though it faces challenges including slow progress in 
resolving the barriers once they have been identified. There is presently no mechanism 
for ensuring that countries follow a process of either justifying their NTBs or compel 
them to remove them once a barrier has been notified. The absence of an enforcement 
mechanism with strict time limits for action and sanctions for non-compliance means 
each country retains discretion to adopt measures for removing or reforming their NTBs. 
4.2 OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP 
The legal framework governing economic integration in both EAC and SADC has been 
unable to prevent member states from belonging to more than one regional economic 
community. They do not preclude members from maintaining prior trade agreements or 
from entering new ones. The Customs Union Protocol permits members to honour their 
commitments in respect of other international organizations to which they belong.198 The 
Trade Protocol also allows member states to conclude trade agreements with third parties 
provided the terms of such an agreement are not in conflict with the provisions of the 
Protocol.199 Similarly SADC members are allowed to maintain preferential trade 
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agreements that they belonged to before the Trade Protocol was entered into force.200 
SADC members are also permitted to enter into new preferential trade arrangements 
among themselves provided that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Protocol.201 This creates a complex web of relations in which states owe multiple 
allegiance to the trading regimes created in each REC. This allegiance extends to both 
substantive and procedural obligations. It undermines the implementation of the 
agreements where a country belongs to two or more integration organizations with 
conflicting policies. For example Tanzania which was already a member of SADC before 
EAC came into being is not required to terminate her obligations under SADC. As EAC’s 
customs union already exists, should SADC establish a customs union, it will be 
technically and legally impossible for Tanzania to apply two different CET. Procedural 
obligations dictates that in the event of a dispute, states should utilize the agreed upon 
mechanism to resolve disputes. Since there is no rule of exclusivity of one dispute 
resolution over another, this means that states are in a position to decide which of the 
available mechanisms will suit their needs in the case of conflict.  
              The issue of overlapping membership is even more complex in SADC than in 
EAC. While all EAC members states are members of the COMESA (apart from Tanzania 
which is a member of SADC): majority of SADC countries belong to one or more of the 
following regional trade areas: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the East African Community 
(EAC). This makes it difficult for member states to negotiate a common external tariff as 
members have continued to pursue customs union ambitions in other arrangements such 
as EAC, COMESA and SACU. As a result no consensus has been reached on adoption of 
common trade policy among SADC member states.  Thus the multiplicity of regulations 
and duplication of procedures operate to create business uncertainties that hamper intra-
regional trade. Indeed in a rationalized system with minimum overlapping memberships 
and no duplication of activities and procedures, member states would find it easier to 
implement trade protocols of the respective RTA. Multiple memberships remains a major 
obstacle to free movement of goods as partner states are forced to establish border 
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stations to monitor movement of goods enjoying preferential treatment. These overlaps 
have a bearing on the costs and the benefits of integration since they tend to absorb 
human resources, limited financial resources and more fundamentally have implications 
for the process of deeper integration. Given the divergence in economic conditions 
among SADC members and overlapping membership, a variable geometric approach 
within a rule-based system would be an optimal strategy for SADC moving forward.202  
4.3 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
A major feature of a rule based system is manifested by a formal dispute settlement 
system whose decisions are automatically binding.203 The WTO provides a useful 
benchmark since its multilateral trade regime contains unique legal and institutional 
features. Dispute settlement in international trade law has evolved from the power based 
mechanisms of the GATT era characterized by diplomatic methods such as conciliation, 
negotiation and mediation to the rule based mechanisms of the WTO era characterized by 
independent judiciaries.204 The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is 
described as a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system.205  By providing a rule-based system with an effective adjudicating 
process for disputes, the WTO has allowed states to enter into binding commitments in 
the economic sphere.206 Members are assured that when they make complaints against 
another states act or omission, such will be dealt with in line with the DSU provisions 
and the adoption of panel or appellate rulings issued thereafter is compulsory and 
binding.207 During the GATT era, the resolutions were not final because they were made 
by the contracting parties on a political instead of a legal basis. Political consensus in 
adopting the panel ruling made it possible for the defeated party to oppose its adoption. A 
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lesson to be learned from the previous GATT regime is that, when trade is not conducted 
on the basis of rules, trade disputes will be settled through diplomacy and power 
considerations. This will compromise the predictability, transparency and certainty of the 
trade regime.208 
              The EAC and SADC Treaties rate judicial bodies among the main organs of 
their regional organizations whose primary objective is to adjudicate over disputes that 
might arise among the member states or in relation to the provisions of the EAC and 
SADC Treaty respectively.209 The Trade Protocol specifically provides that the decisions 
of the SADC tribunal are binding upon parties.210 This is a step forward to establish 
institutional frameworks to adjudicate questions of interpretation and implementation of 
protocols. However the key issue is whether in practice these dispute settlement 
mechanisms have been utilized to effect compliance of member states to their 
commitments under the trade regimes. This study will shed light to the practical 
experience and reveal that governments are reluctant to submit to regional dispute 
resolution processes, thus limiting the role of regional judicial organs in so far as their 
role in economic integration is concerned.  
4.3.1 Enforcement of regional judicial decisions in EAC 
The EAC treaty establishes a court of justice as one of its principal institutions.211 The 
EAC Court of Justice (EACJ) which has been operational since 2001 is the final 
authoritative forum in matters of interpretation and application of the Treaty.212 The court 
has jurisdiction to settle disputes concerning a member state’s infringement of Treaty 
obligations.213 It is worth noting that the EAC judicial system does not provide for the 
compulsory requirement and time frames within which member states must adopt the 
EACJ’s rulings. Members are merely obliged to implement its decisions in good faith.214 
As such, member states have discretion to take measures to implement a 
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judgment.215Another observation is that, political conditions may prevent it from 
operating on a purely legal basis. This was revealed in the Council’s response after the 
EACJ’s ruling in the Anyang Nyong case when the court concluded that the election of 
the Kenyan representatives to the East Africa Legislative Assembly (EALA) contravened 
Article 50 of the EAC Treaty in so far as no elections were held on that matter.216 The 
interim suspension of the inauguration of the EALA was not highly regarded by the 
Council of Ministers. The Summit responded by amending the treaty provisions to extend 
the grounds for removal of judges from office.217 This move was calculated to intimidate 
the judges and consequently was likely to jeopardize the just resolution of the dispute. 218 
Indeed by so doing the security of tenure of the judges was seriously put at risk. Thus 
member states agreed to limit the regional judicial power which they had established to 
uphold the rule of law.219 In a subsequent EACJ case, the judges after careful reasoning 
concluded that though the Council was entitled to consider the implications of the interim 
order and identify a solution to the problem resulting from suspension of the EALA 
activities, the Council’s recommendation to restructure the court had no bearing on the 
solution of the identified problem.220 Hence the court declared that the impugned 
amendment process was inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the treaty. 
Particularly that the amendment of the provision on the grounds of removing judges 
infringed EAC Treaty Article 38(2).221 However the court refused to declare the whole 
amendment process invalid. As such, the court decided to apply the doctrine that its 
decision had no retrospective effect.222  The decision of the EAC member states to amend 
the EAC Treaty following the decision of the EACJ may be seen as a challenge to the 
legitimacy of the EACJ decisions due to the political impact of that decision. 
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4.3.2 Enforcement of regional judicial decisions in SADC 
As some authors once noted, one of the vital components for sustainability of economic 
integration process is the legitimacy and effectiveness of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms.223 Dispute settlement is an essential element of governance in economic 
integration. It improves the chances of state compliance with their treaty obligations and 
instills business confidence.  One of the enforcement problems is the resistance which 
many African states have towards an interference of their sovereignty.  The reluctance to 
cede the exercise of some sovereignty powers to an international organization translates 
into a low degree of institutionalization of interstate cooperation.224 Economic integration 
entails an inevitable loss of autonomy over what was once considered internal decisions. 
It must be acknowledged that by the very nature of the objectives they set to achieve, 
each partner state is expected to cede some amount of sovereignty to the community and 
its organs to enable them to play their role.225 The fear of relinquishing sovereignty is an 
obstacle to achievement of trade liberalization objectives. Lack of political will to comply 
with judicial decisions creates an enforcement gap and is an obstacle to the positive role 
which dispute settlement plays in the economic integration process. 
              The above observation is true in the context of the SADC tribunal decision in the 
Campbell case. 226 The refusal of Zimbabwe to comply with the tribunal decision alleging 
the invalidity of the Tribunal Protocol expresses the unwillingness of member states to be 
sued in a regional forum which is seen as interference with their own national 
sovereignty.227  Further, when the tribunal referred the non-compliance of Zimbabwe to 
the summit, the summit did not take any action against Zimbabwe however it took an 
action against the tribunal. The summit’s decision to suspend the tribunal in 2010 
pending a review of its role and function, and its subsequent close down in 2012 reveals 
lack of legal autonomy  in the judicial organs hence the SADC regional organization still 
remains a power-based system. The SADC Summit decision represents a major step 
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backwards for economic integration within the organization which it itself aims at being a 
rule based system. The summit further proposed that a new tribunal protocol will have to 
be negotiated between member states and its jurisdiction will be limited to resolving 
disputes between member states concerning the interpretation of the SADC Treaty.228 
This means that individuals’ direct access to regional justice would no longer be granted. 
The absence of locus standi for individuals will restrict the number of potential disputes 
that may be brought before the tribunal. This makes the dispute settlement process 
unavailable to some of the most important players in the integration process such as 
consumers, investors and traders. The absence of individual rights of action reveals a 
desire of the states to dominate the judicial process. Another major concern is the fact 
that ratification will be required as a pre-requisite for the new Protocol for the Tribunal to 
enter into force.229 It may take many more years before the tribunal becomes operational 
again. The outcome of this will be an ineffective trade regime which lacks a functioning 
forum to rule on the correct interpretation of the legal provisions. As a result, challenges 
arising from the implementation of decisions reached will be resolved by political organs 
such as the Summit of the Heads of States and the Council. Hence a mandatory and 
transparent mechanism for monitoring the enforcement of regional standards will remain 
absent.230 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Regional agreements need to be implemented in order to achieve the objectives for which 
they have been concluded. Compliance refers to an action (implementation) which is in 
accordance with the applicable rule or standard. The levels of economic integration 
envisaged by both communities demand a strong adherence to the rule of law to be 
effective. 
              In this chapter it was observed that there is a relatively slow progress in so far as 
the elimination of non-tariff barriers is concerned. Both regions face a challenge of 
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member states not complying with the commitments contained in the Customs Union 
Protocol and the Protocol on Trade respectively. The potential gains from trade 
liberalization are limited by the imposition of non-tariff barriers which is a violation of 
the provisions of the respective legal instruments. The potential benefits from these 
protocols will only be realized with effective compliance with commitments undertaken. 
Compliance requires more than political will and calls for a proper functioning legal 
framework. The commitment to eliminate non-tariff barriers remains a challenge. This 
may be attributed to the current weak regional institutional mechanisms put in place to 
monitor implementation of the commitments. 
              Another challenge relates to the inadequacy of regional courts to adjudicate and 
enforce decisions on disputes relating to violation of treaty obligations by member states. 
Though both treaties contain legal provisions for dispute settlement, members are 
reluctant to resort to the dispute settlement mechanisms established by the treaties. It is 
worth mentioning that an analysis of jurisprudence of these regional judicial bodies 
reveals that cases brought before them are relatively few. About 16 matters have been 
brought before the SADC Tribunal since it became operational in 2005.231 By the end of 
2011, the EACJ had rendered about 14 judgments and 29 rulings. This figures are 
relatively low compared to the European Community Court of Justice which had 
determined over 350 cases (from 1995 to 2009) relating to the Customs Union and 
Common Market.232 Another observation is that the utilization of regional judicial bodies 
to litigate economic integration issues has been scanty. In the case of SADC, most of the 
disputes referred to the regional judicial bodies resulted from action instituted by 
individuals alleging violation of human rights by the member states. Matters such as 
NTBs, tariff classification or rules of origin have not generated disputes (Erasmus 2011). 
Disputes should not be manufactured. However the meager participation in dispute 
settlement mechanism indicates that there is insufficient awareness about the trade 
liberalization provisions and how to enforce them. 
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              Establishment of permanent judicial organs reveals the willingness of both EAC 
and SADC to respect and adhere to the rule of law. They seemed to acknowledge that for 
a regional integration process to be successful; the rule of law should prevail over 
political power and create legal accountability. The simple provision of a judicial organ 
with supra-national jurisdiction is not a guarantee of effective adjudication. The decision 
of the SADC Summit to close the tribunal and the EAC member states to amend the 
treaty and the court’s jurisdiction demonstrates that member states may disregard the 
courts’ decisions due to the political impact of that decision, leading to low levels of 
treaty compliance and enforcement.  As observed in the case of the SADC tribunal and 
the EAC case233, it is possible to design a supra-national tribunal on paper while at the 
same time being conscious that political condition may prevent it operating on a legal 
basis. As such, these RTAs still remain power oriented systems. Experience from the 
WTO multilateral trade liberalization initiative has shown that it is through the 
development of jurisprudence regarding implementation of community law that the 
momentum necessary for effective integration is generated and maintained (Erasmus 
2011). The decisions of the Panel and Appellate Body are used as valuable interpretations 
for future cases. 
              Consequently, the implementation of key decisions and objectives by member 
States may stagnate, because of the underlying weaknesses existing in legal and 
institutional frameworks that do not enforce compliance. As such, the implementation 
and monitoring of protocols and consequences of non-compliance are lax and depend on 
the goodwill of individual member states. This state of affairs does not augur well for 
effective regional integration. 
  
                                                          







5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In Africa, the need for establishing RTAs was recognized under the Organization of 
Africa Unity (OAU),234 and is an objective of the African Economic Community 
(AEC),235 and the African Union (AU).236 It was viewed as an avenue for the eventual 
continental economic community. This shall be achieved through a gradual process 
involving six stages commencing with a call to create and strengthen existing RECs, 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, establishment of a free trade area, a customs 
union, a common market and finally the establishment of an African Economic Union 
whereby economic policies will be continentally uniform.237 The rules of multi-lateral 
trade system also recognize that the advantage of RTAs is that they allow freedom of 
trade through closer integration of economies of parties to such agreement.238 It is viewed 
that closer integration between parties to such agreements will contribute to the 
expansion of the world trade.239 
              The AEC was founded on the ultimate goal of promoting economic integration 
in order to increase self reliance and promote self sustained development.240 A major aim 
of these efforts is to expand intra-African trade by eliminating tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to facilitate the free movement of goods.241 Significant progress has been made 
since the Lagos Plan of Action in forming regional economic communities to foster trade 
and economic integration. Despite the establishment of African RTAs, Africa’s share in 
global trade may be regarded as low and intra-African trade is lower than in other 
economic regions.242 Failure of some member states to meet their commitments to 
eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers has largely contributed to low intra-African trade. 
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Implementation of the commitments at each regional level is essential to fast track the 
realization of a continental common market. Owing to the scope of this study, only the 
progress of the implementation of the trade liberalization objectives under the EAC and 
SADC trade regimes were analyzed.  
5.2 RESPONDING TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Domestic implementation of obligations in agreements establishing FTAs and CUs is 
critical for the attainment of the objective to eliminate trade barriers in intra-regional 
trade. In this study effectiveness of the economic integration is assessed based on the 
level of compliance with the rules relating to intra-regional trade liberalization. This 
study is founded on the notion that effective compliance requires a higher degree of 
adherence to the rule of law. A rule based trade regime secures the benefits of trade more 
optimally by providing a transparent and predictable environment for producers, traders 
and consumers.243 Rule based trade agreements display certain substantive as well as 
procedural features. One of reasons why SADC and EAC can be regarded as rule- based 
regimes is that they have to function in terms of WTO rules applicable to the creation of 
customs union and free trade areas.244 It was revealed that both blocs have complied with 
the Article XXIV GATT requirements for formation of RTAs.245  
              For the legal framework to be effective, it must contain clearly framed precise 
norms. Norms are the basis in which regulation and compliance are founded, thus clear 
and precise norms are essential to effective regimes.246 Since RTAs carry a firm 
commitment to take affirmative measures to eliminate or reduce barriers to trade within 
parties involved, the respective trade agreements should contain elaborate provisions 
regarding elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Just as the multilateral trade regime 
is guided by the principle of reducing tariff based impediments to trade,247 similarly are 
EAC and SADC trade agreements. Measured in terms of agreements, both the EAC and 
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SADC share the same objectives of creating a larger economic space among the members 
through elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers.248 At the time the EAC customs 
Union was launched, 2010 was the targeted year for removal of all internal trade tariffs. 
The 2010 goal was achieved. On the other hand 2012 was the targeted year to complete 
internal tariffs elimination among SADC member states.249 By 2012 some of the SADC 
member states had attained the target though some were still behind schedule.  When 
assessing the effectiveness of the terms of the Trade Protocol, it was observed that Article 
3(1)(c) by allowing member states to derogate from their commitments undermines the 
overall objective of tariff elimination. This gives the Committee of Ministers of Trade 
discretion to decide each application on a case by case basis, instead of being guided by a 
clear and transparent procedure that is applicable to all Article 3 applications. Another 
provision that has potential to encourage protectionism is found in Article 21 which 
allows for the possibility of temporary measures to promote infant industries by 
suspending trade liberalization objectives. It fails to set out criteria of determining what 
constitutes an infant industry. It also fails to specify a maximum time limit for which 
such protection should be granted. The effective implementation of the tariff 
liberalization in EAC can be attributed to the existence of clear trade liberalization 
obligations as set out in its Customs Union Protocol and superiority of community law 
over national law.250 Another factor is the presence of a harmonized customs legal regime 
comprised of a common tariff structure, a uniform EAC Customs Management Act, 
simplified Rules of Origin and Customs Regulations which have been adopted for 
uniform application in all partner states. A lesson that SADC can learn from EAC is that 
comprehensive legal instruments with clear terms are essential for effective trade 
regimes. 
              Though tariff liberalization in both blocs is quite impressive, free movement of 
goods within member states is greatly hindered by the presence of non-tariff barriers. 
Members continue to impose NTBs. The continued existence of NTBs is a result of the 
weakness of the legal frameworks which fail to provide concrete measures on how to 
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249 ‘SADC Integration milestones’, available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-
trade-area/; last assessed on 3rd July, 2014. 
250 Article 8(4) EAC Treaty. 
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eliminate NTBs. Both the Customs Union Protocol and the Trade Protocol obliges 
members to eliminate and refrain from imposing NTBs.251 The weakness of such 
provisions is that the decision of how to put a stop to NTBs has been left for the national 
governments to decide. The legal instruments remain silent on what will happen in the 
case of non-compliance with this obligation. All this should be provided for in their legal 
instruments. Though the NTB monitoring mechanism adopted by the EAC-SADC-
COMESA tripartite is a positive step towards transparency, no penalties exist for non-
compliance.  
              Achievement of trade liberalization objectives requires strong institutional 
frameworks capable of withstanding political pressure. From an integration perspective 
the regional judicial organs of both RECs have played a negligible role in economic 
integration. Although fundamentally these courts are replications of the European Union 
Court of Justice (EUCJ), they have not had a similar impact on their regions. Whereas the 
EUCJ played a central role in the EU integration through its jurisprudence on 
infringement and annulment actions and preliminary rulings, this jurisprudence has not 
been translated into the jurisprudence of the regional courts of EAC and SADC. 
Businesses that are operating in various East African countries are operating in a legal 
void when it comes to enforcing contracts, leaving them to go for litigation in national 
courts. The EACJ ruled that the treaty establishing the bloc had locked commercial 
disputes out of its purview, restricting its mandate to interpretation of the EAC treaty. 
This means only state organs can move to the court to seek legal redress in a dispute with 
agencies of other member states. Private firms are the most likely to be affected and will 
shy away from markets where they are unable to enforce their rights.    
              Given the low level of compliance with regional judicial decisions coupled with 
the under-utilization of regional dispute settlement mechanisms, the regional courts have 
been largely ineffective in fulfilling their integration roles. Ultimately the success of 
African RTAs and the effectiveness of their courts in reinforcing integration will depend 
on the political will of the member states and their willingness to meet their treaty 
obligations and commitments. 
                                                          




There is great opportunity for EAC and SADC to move towards better economic 
competitiveness through elimination of barriers to intra-regional trade. The overall 
assessment is that despite significant progress in trade liberalization through internal 
tariff liberalization, both blocs can do much better. In light of the above, the following 
recommendations are made: 
5.3.1 Trade compliance monitoring mechanism 
The realization of the SADC FTA is slowed down by country-level implementation 
problems. This study recommends that a trade monitoring mechanism should be 
implemented in order to ensure that SADC member states implement agreed tariff 
reduction schedule and to provide a mechanism for resolving problems on a day to day 
basis. The effective implementation of the SADC FTA will be a stepping stone for the 
establishment of the Customs Union. The importance of putting in place an effective and 
strict mechanism for compliance and strict enforcement of these decisions into 
community law should be emphasized.  
5.3.2. Derogation procedures 
The cumulative effect of derogation clause252 has the potential to undermine the overall 
objective of tariff liberalization. SADC Council of Ministers of Trade (CMT) should 
implement derogation procedures establishing substantive rules and criteria for granting 
of the grace period. This should provide for a maximum time frame within which the 
derogation will be granted and outline conditions for which extensions can be granted. In 
addition sanctions should be imposed against member states that persistently fail without 
good cause to comply with their obligation upon expiry of the grace period. 
5.3.3 Enforcement mechanism for sanctioning non-compliance 
Removal of non-tariff barriers is critical to EAC and SADC integration. This study 
recommends a review of the NTB Monitoring Mechanism and introduction of penalties 
for non-compliance with obligation to remove NTBs. 
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5.3.4 Revision of SADC Rules of Origin 
Free movement of goods in SADC has been hampered by complicated and restrictive 
rules of origin. It is recommended that the complex rules of origin be revised and come 
up with rules that are more practical for the region that will require lower thresholds for 
regional value addition. This would enable many smaller SADC countries to expand their 
trade performance. For example, this will allow producers involved in textile production 
to source cheap inputs from global sources and so increase their export competitiveness. 
Since majority of the SADC member states are also members of COMESA, this study 
recommends that they should adopt COMESA rules of origin which are more flexible 
than those of SADC.  
5.3.5 Harmonization of SPS and TBT measures 
As was observed, individual member states continue to apply national testing and 
procedures and standards on imported products. Member states are recommended to 
refrain from applying national standards and adopt regional harmonized standards where 
they exist. Member states should ensure that existing national laws are in line with 
regional regulations. 
5.3.6 Harmonization of custom procedures and internal taxes 
The future success of the EAC’s single customs territory will be guaranteed if EAC 
member states harmonize their structure for collective administration of the customs 
union which entails collection of taxes at the first points of entry and pooling of revenues 
collected at the regional level. Member states are recommended to put more efforts to 
accelerate the simplification of custom procedure and standardization of the required 
documents. This is desirable under the common market and monetary union steps the 
community is moving into. 
              SADC Customs authorities should implement a common policy of automatically 
communicating the reasons for rejecting values declared by importers and explain how 




              Member states are also recommended to invest in customs administration 
reforms that cultivate a high level of professionalism and integrity and are more 
transparent on their procedures. 
5.3.7 Ensure effective enforcement and compliance with court decisions 
Both regions have not developed the institutions needed for market integration. In 
particular, trade disputes are still resolved in national courts. There has been insufficient 
pooling of sovereignty. There is need to replace national courts for trade dispute with a 
stable regional supra-national system. An appropriate, independent supranational 
authority should be adequately empowered with rules for enforcing and penalizing any 
errant behavior by non-compliant members. This study recommends that a number of 
actions need to be reconciled and this includes the importance of ensuring that judicial 
decisions made in support of building the RECs are enforced at all levels by the parties 
involved. Rule-based governance could contribute to the harmonization of the laws of 
Partner States through development of jurisprudence in the region and address challenges 
of non-compliance of regional trade obligations. 
5.3.8 Improve accessibility to justice   
This study recommends that apart from statutory access provided in the Treaty,253 the 
EACJ court should establish sub-registries in the partner states in a bid to bring 
accessibility of justice nearer to the people. This will immensely contribute to the 
improvement of regional judicial mechanism. 
              In the case of the SADC Tribunal, a plausible alternative is to allow individuals 
to litigate before the SADC tribunal with special leave of the court.254 Another alternative 
is to create a reference procedure between national courts and the SADC tribunal. This 
alternative would provide individuals access to the tribunal. 
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5.3.9 Ensure supremacy of community law over national law 
The EAC Treaty elevates community law above national law.255 The SADC Treaty states 
that member states shall take all necessary steps to accord the Treaty the force of national 
law.256 This provision simply means that direct applicability of community law is not 
guaranteed. This study recommends an inclusion of a provision that has a defined time 
frame for the legislation to be enacted and penalties for non-compliance. 
5.3.10 Improve dissemination of trade information 
A sizeable number of businesses in EAC are not aware about newly introduced SPS 
regulations in their countries as well as in other EAC countries. As a result, businesses 
incur extra costs in form of bribery averaging USD 200 to over 1 000 per transaction.257 
Time is also lost sorting out non-compliance with SPS requirements estimated to upto 
two days. This calls for sensitization of businesses about SPS requirements related to 
cross border trade. It was also observed that many informal cross border traders are not 
yet aware about the simplified rules of origin and are subjected to harassment by border 
security officials who demand bribes to help goods cross borders.258 It is recommended 
that EAC Secretariat increase efforts to disseminate information about the simplified 
trade regulations to the business community, customs agents and other relevant 
stakeholders. One of the ways of achieving this could be through the use of regular 
regional trade fairs and trade expos. 
              Similarly, it is recommended for the SADC Secretariat to disseminate 
information regarding regulations, procedures and other rules that govern trade in SADC. 
Individuals can serve as an effective means for monitoring compliance with community 
law through their reporting of breaches. Education on community law and creating an 
accessible means for filing complaints will strengthen their monitoring role.  
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5.3.11 Cooperation in infrastructure 
It has been recognized that while elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers is relevant, it 
will not lead to a significant expansion in intra-regional trade given the structural 
deficiencies which exist.259 The geographical reality is that three of the EAC members are 
landlocked and dependent upon the infrastructure of the two coastal members. The EAC 
needs to develop its railways and ports in order to ease movement of goods. Investment 
in good quality infrastructure is expensive hence there is need to attract private finance 
where possible. Currently private investors view multi-country projects more politically 
risky than single country projects. It is recommended that governments should serve as a 
check on one another so that an EAC commitment is seen as more credible than a 
national commitment. The focus on regional infrastructure development will further 
boost regional trade, investment and integration and make the region economically 
competitive. 
              Similarly SADC member states should expeditiously implement the SADC 
Infrastructure Master Plan Vision 2027. The plan will serve as a strategic framework to 
guide the implementation of cross-border infrastructure networks in an integrated 
manner. 
5.3.12 Increase political will to ensure implementation 
The enthusiasm for economic integration has not been matched by commensurate 
political will and commitment of member states to effectively implement agreements 
reached under the integration agreements. Some countries seem not ready for the partial 
surrender and the pooling of sovereignty, which is critical for the success of any 
economic integration. Lack of political will and commitment has been reflected in the 
failure to meet target dates set for the attainment of objectives. This study finally 
recommends firm political commitment and leadership essential for consistent 
progression to deeper regional economic integration.  
  
                                                          
259 African Development Bank Report 2010; available at 
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